

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 17673

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CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY AND ASST SECY SAUNDERS ONLY FROM
AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR PBOR EG IS US
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR
NEGOTIATING MIDDLE EAST PEACE

1. FURTHER TO OUR DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON, I WANT TO SET
FORTH A FEW THOUGHTS ON WHAT MIGHT USEFULLY BE INCLUDED IN
ANY U.S. SUGGESTIONS THAT WE MAY AT ANY TIME WANT TO PUT
FORWARD TO BREAK THE PRESENT IMPASSE IF SUCH SUGGESTIONS
ARE TO BE AGREEABLE TO EGYPT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DO SO
IN ABSENCE OF AGREED FRAMEWORK.

2. SADAT STILL WANTS A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, WHICH
HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE IS NECESSARY (A) TO GET HUSSEIN
INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND (B) TO REASSURE THE ARAB WORLD,
AND ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA, THAT GOE IS NOT SIMPLY OPTING
OUT AND IS IN FACT NEGOTIATING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLE-
MENT. THE PRIME REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY SUCH DECLARATION TO
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HAVE THE IMPACT THAT SADAT REQUIRES ARE (A) AN ISRAELI
COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO THE
67 BOUNDARIES WITH ONLY MINOR RECTIFICATIONS IN THE WEST
BANK AND (B) ISRAELI WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO RESOLVE
THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. SIMPLY RELYING
ON THE VAGUE GENERALITIES OF 242 IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ENOUGH
AND, IT SEEMS TO ME, THAT ANY U.S. SUGGESTION SHOULD SEEK

TO PUT SOME MEAT ON THE BARE BONES OF THE 242 SKELETON.

3. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO GET THE PARTIES NEGOTIATING, BUT THIS HAS THUS FAR NOT BEEN POSSIBLE AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ON THE BASIS OF EITHER THE BEGIN OR THE EGYPTIAN WEST BANK PROPOSALS. HENCE, ANY USG PROPOSAL SHOULD, TO MY MIND, GO BEYOND THE GENERALITIES OF 242 AND GIVE THE PARTIES SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO GNAW ON. THE EGYPTIANS, MOREOVER, AS A RESULT OF OUR TALKS WITH THEM, EXPECT THAT ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MAY OFFER WILL BE GENERALLY CLOSE TO THEIR IDEAS, ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY ALSO BE SOME UNPALATABLE POINTS.

4. SOME POINTS THAT THEY WILL EXPECT ARE THE FOLLOWING:

A. IN ANY WITHDRAWAL LANGUAGE, NOT ONLY REFERENCE TO SECURE AND AGREED UPON BOUNDARIES (A LA 242), BUT SOME SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONCEPT THAT BOUNDARY RECTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE WEST BANK AND BE MINOR IN NATURE. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS NOT WHAT THE ISRAELIS WANT, BUT THE EGYPTIANS EXPECT US TO ABIDE BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT MINOR RECTIFICATIONS AND TO CONTINUE TO PUSH THIS CONCEPT IN ANYTHING WE PUT FORWARD.

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B. A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, BUT ALSO SOMETHING THAT WOULD REAFFIRM FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES THE RIGHT OF REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION AS STIPULATED IN UN RESOLUTION 194. CONSULTATIONS ON ORGANIZING TALKS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ON SOLVING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WOULD NOT IN ITSELF, IN MY VIEW, BE SATISFACTORY TO EGYPTIANS BECAUSE IT SMACKS TOO MUCH OF WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE U.S./ISRAELI WORKING PAPER. AS YOU KNOW, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE COME TO INSIST ON THE TERM "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AS CITED IN U.S./SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, BUT THEY WILL ALSO ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE IN PLACE OF A FLAT SELF-DETERMINATION DECLARATION. KAMEL WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT ON THIS THAN SADAT, ALTHOUGH KAMEL ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT SADAT ACCEPTS IT. IT MAY BE ONE OF THE POINTS THAT, AS SADAT PUTS IT, USG WILL HAVE TO "PRESS" ON EGYPTIANS.

C. MODALITIES OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE EGYPTIANS, PROVIDED THERE IS SOME CLEAR INDICATION OF WHAT HAPPENS AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE EGYPTIANS

THEMSELVES GAVE US THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SEQUENCE ON WEST BANK/GAZA TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT (CAIRO 17578) BUT THE ISRAELI REPLIES TO OUR TWO QUESTIONS ARE CLEARLY UNSATISFYING. EGYPT WOULD EXPECT ANY U.S. SUGGESTIONS TO CLARIFY THIS POINT IN AS SPECIFIC TERMS AS POSSIBLE. THE LATEST ISRAELI FORMULA OF A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOVEREIGNTY ARRANGEMENTS AT THE END OF THE FIVE YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS NOT LIKELY TO

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GIVE THE EGYPTIANS MUCH SATISFACTION, SINCE EGYPTIANS DENY ANY ISRAELI RIGHT TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

D. THE EGYPTIANS WOULD ALSO LIKE ANY U.S. SUGGESTIONS TO ADDRESS OUR VIEWS ON WHAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED SHORT OF TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS.

E. IN CITING THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF 242, THE EGYPTIANS WILL EXPECT INCLUSION OF THE PREAMBULAR PROVISION CALLING FOR THE NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. AS YOU KNOW, THEY BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME WEIGHT AS OPERATIVE CLAUSES OF THAT RESOLUTION AND POINT TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THAT PREAMBULAR CLAUSE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR VIEW.

5. THE EGYPTIANS (MEANING SADAT) WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND/OR GAZA ALONG WITH THE ISRAELIS PROVIDED SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES ARE MUTUALLY NEGOTIATED. I

WOULD CAUTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MAY BE SOME EGYPTIAN
MILITARY ELEMENTS WHO MIGHT BALK ABOUT AN EGYPTIAN
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN WEST BANK/GAZA SECURITY PRIOR TO
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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. (ONE OF THE RECENT POTENTIALLY DISTURBING ELEMENTS IS THE INCREASING NUMBER OF REPORTS WE ARE GETTING OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PACE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND SENIOR EGYPTIAN GENERALS URGING GAMASY NOT TO GET OUT FRONT AND LEAVE THIS TO SADAT. THIS MEANS THAT IT IS SADAT WHO IS EXPOSING HIMSELF. WITHOUT EGYPTIAN MILITARY BACKING IT INCREASES THE RISKS, FOR HIM, BUT IT IS SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO MAKE ANY HARD ASSESSMENT OF EXTENT TO WHICH GROWING MILITARY RESTIVENESS COULD AFFECT HIS NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY. SADAT'S PROBLEM IS THAT MILITARY DO NOT SEE THAT ANYTHING HAS RESULTED FROM SADAT INITIATIVE.)

6. THE ISSUE OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK MUST, OF COURSE, BE ADDRESSED, BUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE ISRAELI RIGHT TO BUY LANDS WILL BE A RED FLAG TO THE EGYPTIANS WHO SEE THIS AS A LONGSTANDING ISRAELI TECHNIQUE TO EFFECT DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

7. THE EGYPTIANS ENDORSE THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF UNEF FORCES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND WOULD LIKE THAT INCLUDED IN ANY U.S. SUGGESTIONS.

8. ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, SADAT ACCEPTS THIS PRINCIPLE, BUT OBJECTS TO IT AS A "CONDITION" FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT.

9. REGRET THAT ABOVE IS SOMEWHAT GENERAL IN NATURE, BUT I HOPE IT IS OF SOME HELP IN REFINING OUR THINKING. I WILL ALSO WANT TO TALK TO ROY ABOUT SUBJECT WHEN HE COMES. EILTS

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